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"AN UNIFORM
AND
TRACTABLE VICE''
Samuel Johnson and the
Transformation of the Passions
into
Interests
Charles H. Hinnant

^
f Cy Jr

n his classic Passions and Interests: Political Arguments for
Capitalism before its Triumph, republished in 1997 in a
twentieth-year anniversary edition, Albert Hirschman
traced the fascinating story of how, from the Reformation on, the sin
of avarice became less and less objectionable and was eventually
transformed from a "passion" into an "interest." Basic to this transfor
mation was the venerable theory that one passion can be used to check
another, that greed could be usefully employed in opposing much more
dangerous and unruly passions like gambling, drinking, and fornication.
SamuelJohnson was seen as playing an important part in this story, for
his pronouncement, recorded in Boswell's Life,that "there are few ways
in which a man can be more innocently employed than in getting
money" was cited by Hirschman as evidence of how money-making
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had now become a positively harmless pastime.' Indeed, as "an
uniform and tractable vice"—the phrase that Pekuah, the favorite maid
of Nekayah in Johnson's Oriental tale, Rasselas, uses to describe the
ruling passion of the Arab chieftain who has recently abducted
her—avarice virtually ceases to be a vice at all and instead becomes an
"interest," opposed to our passions by its very predictability and
rationality.^
Now there is no question that these two quotations appear to
confirm Johnson's role in this narrative of the transformation of the
passions into interests. And when the quotations are joined to his
praise of Bernard Mandeville's famous paradox that public benefit
comes from private vices, Johnson can easily be constmed as embrac
ing the ethos of modem economic individualism and even anticipating
capitalism's triumph.^ There has been little discussion of this issue in
recent commentary on Johnson, but one scholar has contended that
"Johnson recognized the economic value of self-interest, which is a
cardinal principle of the Wealth of Nations."* Now, it is not my purpose
to rain on this happy parade so much as to reconsider Johnson's part
in it. By examining Johnson's views on the passions and interests, I
hope not only to reopen the question of his role in the evolving
discourse of capitalism but also to discover complications in his
attitude toward the pursuit of wealth. It is always the exceptional
statement that captures attention, I would argue, while less familiar
utterances pass without notice. In what follows, I reviewjohnson's less
familiar comments on the passions and interests, mainly in the Life and

^SoswelTs Life of Johnson, ed. George Birkbeck Hill, rev. L F. Powell (6 vols., Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1934—1950), 2: 323. Hereafter cited in parenthesis as Life. Albert O. Hirschman, The
Passions and the Isitensts: PoUtical Arguments for Capitahsm hfore its Triumph (Princeton.: Princeton
University Press, 1997), 55. See also 58, 59, and 134.
'•History of Rasselas, ed. George Birkbeck Hill (1887; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), 128.
Hereafter abbreviated in parenthesis as Passelas.
'For a valuable corrective to this cotnmon assumption about Johnson's view of Mandeville, see
Earl Roy Miner, "Dr. Johnson, Mandeville, and 'Public Benefits'," Huntington LibraryQuarterij/lX
(1958): 159-66.
^Clyde Dankert, "Johnson's Economic Ideas," Pipen on Language and Literature 6 (1970): 72. For
Johnson's relation to mercantilism, see John H. Middendorf, "Dr.Johnson and Mercantilism,"
Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960): 66-83; and "Johnson on Wealth and Commerce," in Mary
M. Lascelles, James L. Clifford, J. D. Fleeman, and John P. Hardy, eds., Johnson, Boswell, and their
Circle (Oxfori Clarendon Press, 1965), 47-64. Peter Matthias, "Dr. Johnson and the Business
World," Virginia Quarterif Ptvierrr 51 (1975): 415-27, describes Johnson's fascination with the
mechanical arts and business activities in general.
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in the Rambler, Idler, and Adventurer essays. As my analysis of these
comments indicates, Johnson joins a traditional moralizing discourse
on avarice with a surprisingly modern interpretation of the emerging
language of interests.
It might seem nit-picking to begin by pointing out that the
declaration that "there are few ways in which a man can be more
innocently employed than in getting money" might not be referring to
avarice—the love of gain—at all. The familiarity of this dictum might
obscure just how precise a distinction Johnson might be making. Yet
if we are permitted to read his various pronouncements in the Ufe in
relation to one another, we can establish that Johnson may indeed not
have been referring to avarice in the above remark. At another point in
the L^,Johnson appears to be taking issue with one of the attributes
by which avarice was characteristically understood. David Hume
provides a convenient example of this understanding when he
describes "avarice, or the desire of gain" as "a universal passion, which
operates at all times, in all places, and upon all persons."' In response
to a less categorical version of this statement—namely that "avarice is
inherent in some dispositions"—Johnson replies
No man was born a miser, because no man was born to
possession. Every man is born cupidus—desire of getting; but
not avarus—desirous of keeping. {Life, 3: 322)
Here Johnson distinguishes between two distinct psychological
"givens." The first is the drive that supplies the vital force for the entire
system, namely the desire of getting. The pun on the central term
"getting," signifying "obtaining" and "begetting," summons up the
language of eighteenth-century moral psychology; a man is innocently
employed in getting money because he is exercising an inborn
propensity.' For Johnson, this drive {cupidus) does not reflect an

'"Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences," in T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, eds..
Essays Moral, Political, andUUrary (London: Longmans, 1882), 1,176.
The most explicit formulation of this oudook can be found in Sermon 18 (On Fraud), where
Johnson holds that "he that desires happiness must necessarily desire the means of happiness,
must wish to appropriate, to accumulate... .For this reason every man educates his son in some
useful art, which, by making him necessary to others, may oblige others to repay him, what is
necessary to himself. The general employment of mankind is to increase pleasure, or remove the
pressure of pain. These are the vital principles of action, that fill ports with ships, shops with

64

1650-1850

inherent disposition to avarice which he associates with hoarding or
accumulation {avarus), with the miser rather than the hardworking
trader or spendthrift. Avarice is displayed not in getting money but in
keeping it.^
I need hardly dwell on the implications of this argument. Central
to the narrative of capitalism is a valorization of the motives that impel
capitalists in their insatiable pursuit. By segregating avarus from cupidus,
Johnson calls one of these motives into question, while still retaining
a sense of toughness, of realism. Johnson's point, let me emphasize, is
not to counter the capitalist vision with mutterings that human beings
are generous and disinterested. It is rather to insist that hoarding,
accumulation, is not a natural category and thus cannot be discon
nected from broader moral and historical issues.
All this is not to deny that there were moralists who viewed both
getting and keeping as modes of avarice. Robert Burton, to cite only
one example, defines covetousness in the Anatony of Melancho^ as
"greediness in getting, tenacity in keeping, sordidity in spending" even
as he condemns this "inordinate desire of gain, to get or keep mon^."^
Johnson differs from this tradition, but he is careful to balance his
comments on making money by pointing out that room must be left
for a consideration of the well-being of others, thereby introducing an
"altruistic" element to the passion of cupidity. "Getting money is not
all a man's business," he remarks in another passage in the Ufe-, "to
cultivate kindness is a valuable part of the business of life" (Iffe, 3:
182). In no way, moreover, does Johnson's contention that "kindness"
is cultivated rather than innate diminish theimportance that he attaches
to it. That which endows kindness with its special character lies in the
manufactuiers, and fields with husbandmen, that keep the statesman diligent in attendance, and
the trader active in business," Jean Hagstrum and James Gray, eds. Sermons, Vol. 14 of the Yale
Edition of the Works ofSamuel Johnson (New Haven andLondon; Yale University Press, 1978),
194-95.
'Johnson here approximates the liberal position of John Chrysostom who allows for the
acquisition of wealth, so long as it is shared with others. At one point, Qirysostom declares, "I
accuse not the rich but the rapacious: wealth is one thing covetousness quite another" (0» tbeFcsll
ofEutrvpius, 2,3; quoted from Barry Gordon, The Economic Problem in BibScatanJPatristic Literature
(Leiden: Brill, 1989], 109). A similar point of view can be found in the writings of Clement of
Alexandria. See Gordon, 84-88.
'Robert Burton, The Anatomj ofMelanchop, ed. Floyd Dell and Paul Jordan-Smith (New York:
Tudor Press, 1927), 245. In the Dictionary, Johnson defines avarice, in conventional terms, as
"covetousness, insatiable desire." The OEDalso defines avarice in broad terms, as greed for gain,
cupidity; eager desire to get or keep for oneself.
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manner in which it is exercised, not acquired. According to Johnson,
"a man cannot make a bad use of his money, so far as regards Society
if he does not hoard it; for if he either spends it or lends it out. Society
has the benefit" (Life, 4: 173). Given the bifurcation of functions
between the economic and cultural spheres in eighteenth-century
England, it is not surprising that the central issue then becomes the
relative merits of expenditure versus charity. Johnson's resolution of
this issue differs from the long-standing emphasis on the latter activity:
"it is in general better to spend money than to give it away; for industry
is more promoted by spending money than by giving it away. A man
who spends his money is sure he is doing good with it: he is not so sure
when he gives it away. A man who spends ten thousands a year will do
more good than a man who spends two thousand and gives away
eight" QJfe, 4: 173).
Avarice represents the polar opposite of this practice of spending
and giving. It is never regarded by Johnson as innocent but rather as
the attribute of those who seek to acquire wealth as an end in itself.
Johnson's dedication to John Payne's New Tab/es of Intellect represents
a position that he clearly regards as definitive:
.no motive can sanctify the accumulation of wealth, but an
ardent desire to make the most honourable and virtuous use
of it, by contributing to the support of good government, the
increase of arts and industry, the rewards of genius and
virtue, and the relief of wretchedness and want'
It follows that Johnson never ceases to think of avarice as anything but
a vice in the most traditional terms. Nothing illustrates this more
vividly than the contempt with which he assumes it is universally held:
"You despise a man for avarice," Johnson tells Boswell at one point,
"but do not hate him" {IJfe, 3: 71). To Johnson, this contempt is
evidence of the morally destructive impact of the accumulation of
wealth on the covetous person himself. To emphasixe this point,
Johnson devotes Idler, No. 73 to the paradoxical commonplace that

'Allen T. Ha2en, Samuel Johnson If Prrfaces and Dedications (New Haven.; Yale University Press, 1937),
145-46. See also 'Ramblers, Na 58 and 120.
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"avarice is always poor but poor by its own fault."'" For the individual
who acquires land or gold in the expectation of happiness
the hope is more than the enjoyment; while we consider
them as the means to be used, at some future time, for the
attainment of felicity, we press on our pursuit ardendy and
vigorously, and that ardour secures us from weariness of
ourselves; but no sooner do we sit down to enjoy our
acquisitions, than we find them insufficient to fill up the
vacuities of life. {Idler, Adventurer, 228)
In Johnson, the interplay of material expectation and moral
disillusionment takes the form of a subde dialectic that invests this
conventional moralizing topic with remarkable depths. But there is one
aspect of Johnson's writings, analyzed by Hirschman, that appears to
anticipate the transformation of acquisitiveness into a morally accept
able activity. This involves the reinterpretation of avarice, from a
disruptive "passion" into a steadying "interest." As such, the avid
pursuit of gain was regarded as a calming influence, compared with
such unruly passions as love or jealousy over which no similar rational,
calculating attribute exerted its constraints. In the guise of commerce,
acquisitiveness is thus seen to exert a civilizing effect—a point of view
which we find expressed in Pekuah's observation that avarice is "an
uniform and tractable vice." To be sure, Pekuah also questions the
motives of the Arab chieftain and deplores the ignorance and apathy
into which the women in his seraglio fall as a direct result of their
exposure to his grasping habits. Yet, despite these strictures, as severe
as any Imlac was to offer, Pekuah's estimate of the steadyinginfluence
of avarice on the chieftain seems to outweigh her assessment of its
costs.
Should Pekuah have the final word in our assessment ofJohnson's
appraisal of avarice? I think not. Perhaps nothing is more recurrent in
classical and Christian moral writing than the claim that the distinguish
ing feature of avarice is its resdessness, its insatiability. Johnson aligns
himself with this tradition in Ambler, No. 58, where he holds that "the
'"W. J. Bate, John M. Bullitt, and L. F. Powell, eds. Tht Idhr and the Adventurer, volume 2 of the
Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1963), 227. Herafter abbreviated in parenthesis as Idler, Adventurer.
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love of money has been, in all ages, one of the passions that have given
great disturbance to the world."" Johnson attributes this malign effect,
in part, to "that fraud, rapine, and circumvention, which must have
been produced by an unbounded eagerness of wealth" (^mbler, 3:
312).'^ Pekuah's abduction offers a pointed instance of the unfortunate
consequences of this insatiable desire. There is nothing in the violent
seizure of another person that could possibly be equated with the small
and utilitarian virtues deemed necessary to commercial exchange.
Such an assumption of necessary disturbance is not limited, we
should note, to the drive to amass wealth. A critical corollary of
Johnson's position is that, although it is the desire for wealth that
causes disturbance to the world, the attainment and possession of
wealth are equally corrupting. In fact, when we turn to individuals who
whether "by industry or fortune" have already obtained great riches,
"we find them oppressed with their own abundance, luxurious without
pleasure, idle without ease, impotent and querulous in themselves or
hated by the rest of mankind" {^mbler, 3; 313). Whether or not this
description is psychologically sound, it could serve as an apt portrait of
the Arab chieftain's state of mind. Belonging to a semi-feudal,
precapitalist system, he displays little evidence of the steadying
virtues—^thrift, industry, and sobriety—that supposedly accompany the
introduction of commercial relations into society. That the chieftain's
avarice could come into conflict with the passion of love is implied by
Pekuah who at the end of her recital tells Imlac that the chief "delayed
to send for my ransom, and would perhaps, never have determined
until your agent found a way to him. The gold which he would not
fetch, he could not reject when it was offered. He hastened to prepare
for our journey hither, like a man delivered from the pain of an
intestine conflict" {¥^selas,133).
This general discussion is sufficient to indicate that Johnson's

"W. J. Bate and Albtecht B. Strauss, eds. The Rambler, volumes 3-5 of the Yale Edition of the
Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1969), 3: 309. Hereafter
abbreviated in parenthesis as Rambler.
"One can find similar sentiments in other essays. In Rambler\i\,}ohnson declares "there is no
condition which is not disquieted either with the care of gaining or of keeping money" (gambler,
4: 333); in Rambler "2^2, he refers to "that perpetual contest for wealth which keeps the world in
commotion" {RamblerS: 288); in RawWer 175, Johnson characterizes those who "regulate all their
conduct by their love of money" as "the meanest and cruelest of human beings, with whom, as
with some pestiferous animals, the whole creation seems to be at war" {Rambler, 5:162-63).
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understanding of what he terms "the folly of devoting the heart to the
accumulation of riches"—conforms quite closely, as he himself
acknowledged, to the parameters established by"the ancient moralists"
(^mbler, 3: 309). Rather than to belabor this dimension of Johnson's
thought, I wish to turn to a less commonly remarked aspect of his
moral writings, his interpretation of the emergent discourse of
"interests" that Hirschman examined. There is no need to review the
premises of this discourse except to mention it rests upon the opinion
that the well being of all can be achieved—^in fact, can only be
achieved—by the self-regarding pursuit of the interests of each. If the
accumulation of wealth yields happiness for the individual, it will also
provide it for society. Any lingering doubts about greed and rapacity
are removed by opposing the interests of human beings to their
passions and by contrasting the favorable consequences that ensue
when individuals engage in the harmless pastime of making money to
the calamitous state of affairs that occurs when they give free rein to
their passions. The question then becomes which is preeminent. Hume
gives one answer to this question by contrasting the "love of gain"
which he deems "universal" and "perpetual" with other passions such
as "envy" and "revenge" which "tho' pernicious...operate only at
intervals and are directed at individuals."" This "passion of selfinterest," as Hume calls the love of gain, is far more stable than other
passions, since it is "the only passion that is much better satisfied by its
restraint than by its liberty.""
When we seek to compare Johnson's point of view with that of
Hume, we should acknowledge that "interest" is not a major term in
his moral lexicon; it appears infrequently in his writings and occupies
center stage in only a few passages. Nonetheless, there is one essay,
Bjmbler183, whereJohnson, appearing to take on the kind of argument
advanced by Hume, argues that "envy" is more predominant in the
world than "interest." What links the two apparently disparate qualities,
as Thomas Home has pointed out in another context, is the fact that
desire involves not merely the satisfaction of material needs but also

"David Hume,Treatise ofHuman Nature,ed. Ernest G. Mossner (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1969), 543.
"Hume, Treatise, 544.
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the recognition of others." Johnson obviously concurs with this
assessment, for he begins by postulating a situation in which "the
hostility perpetually exercized between one man and another is caused
by the desire of many for that which only a few can possess"
5: 196). The implication is that interest and envy cannot arise unless
there also exists a condition of scarcity—^not necessarily an insuffi
ciency of resources but rather an unequal distribution of those
resources; "every man would be rich, powerful and famous; yet fame,
power, and riches are only the names of relative conditions, which
imply the obscurity, dependance and poverty of greater numbers"
(^mbler, 5:196-97).
So far there is nothing in this argument that would trouble Hume,
or later utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. Yet by
dwelling on inequality as a basic human condition,Johnson changes the
generation of wealth from a positive sum game in which every person's
gain is at least potentially the occasion for the enrichment of all into a
zero sum game where everyone's gain is someone else's loss. "Interest"
then becomes "the prospect of adding to our possessions what we can
take from others"; envy, "the hope of alleviating the sense of our
disparity by lessening others though we gain nothing ourselves"
(^mbler, 5: 197). The ethical—as opposed to the ana
lytic—contribution of this argument does not reside in the empirical
validity of Johnson's claim, which passes much too easily over the
capacity of acquisitiveness to increase the total amount of wealth in a
commercial society. The moral significance concerns a refocusing of
the acquisitive process. Where Adam Smith employed the metaphor of
the "invisible hand" in the Wealth of Nations to interpret the conse
quences of this process in terms of a positive outcome,Johnson dwells
upon its morally destructive impact. Whether in theguise of "passions"
or "interests," the crucial economic aspect of human motives is that the
pressure of competition, coupled with the condition of scarcity,
removes any possibility of a happy result. In this world of intense
competition, "it must be more natural to rob for gain, than to ravage
only for mischief (Rambler, 5:197); if there is a glimmer of hope, it is
only that "he that falls by the attacks of interest is torn by hungry tigers;

"See Thomas Home, "Envy and Commercial Society: Mandeville and Smith on 'Private Vices,
Public Benefits'," Political Theoiy 9 (1981): 55-69.
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he may discover and resist his enemies" (^mhler, 5:198).
It follows that the pursuit of wealth may pose dangers as daunting
as any other passion. As Johnson puts it, "interest is seldom pursued
but at some hazard. He that hopes to gain much, has commonly
something tolose, and when he ventures to attack superiority,if he fails
to conquer, is irrecoverably crushed" i^mbler, 5: 198). We should
notice that this vision hinges on motives that are always subject to
radical challenge. These motives bear litde resemblance to the placid
self-interest we find in later economic theorizing. "Interest" enters into
Johnson's intensely competitive world, not as a benign influence,
capable of steadying and domesticating social intercourse rather than
disrupting or demoralizing it, but as a passion that requires constant
assertion and vindication through the successful pursvdt of ambitious
objectives. "Interest," in this view, is not rational calculation but
hazardous risk-taking, and therein lies its departure from received
opinion. In this respect, Johnson surprisingly recalls George Gilder
(supposedly President Reagan's favorite author) who, in a somewhat
different context, condemned the traditional understanding of the
language of interests, arguing that "a rational calculation of personal
gain would impel an individual above all to avoid risk and seek
security." The result is that capitalist expansion in Gilder is made the
product of reckless pursuit rather than cautious deliberation. "The
invisible hand of Adam Smith," says Gilder, "would lead to an everenlarging welfare state—to stasis and security."'®
Whatever the clear divergence between this position and John
son's may be, one cannot help thinking that the latter's analysis
ultimately endorses an understanding of interest as adventursome, a
mode of gambling that involves a recognition of the vulnerability of
any major enterprise. Contrary to those who insist that we should
always focus on the public interest,Johnson insists in Rambler, No. 131,
that "it is necessary to distinguish our own interest from that of others,
and that distinction will perhaps assist us in fixing the just limits of
caution and adventurousness" (Rambler, 323).Johnson concedes that
"in an understanding that involves the happiness or the safety of many.
"George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 266. For a similar point of
view, namely that the entrepreneur rather than the capitalist is the driving force behind economic
growth, seeJoseph Schumpeter, TheoryofEconomic Development,trans, ftom the German by Redvers
Opie (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934).
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we certainly have no right to hazard more than is allowed by those who
partake the danger," but goes on to add that "where only ourselves can
suffer by miscarriage, we are not confined within such narrow limits;
and still less is the reproach of temerity, when numbers will achieve
advantage by success, and only one be incommoded" (^mbler, 4:323).
Here we encounter the key dramatis persona of Johnson's conception
of "interest." It is the projector, the innovator, who has led us beyond
"the state of naked, undisciplined, uninstructed nature." As Johnson
puts it.
Whatever has been effected for convenience or elegance,
while it was yet unknown, was believed impossible; and
therefore woiild never been attempted, had not some, more
daring than the rest, adventured to bid defiance to prejudice
and censure. Nor is there yet any reason to doubt that the
same labourwould be rewarded with the same success. There
are qualities in the products of nature yet undiscovered, and
combinations in the powers of art yet untried. It is the duty
of every man to endeavour that something may be added by
his industry to the hereditary aggregate of knowledge and
happiness. To add much can indeed be the lot of few, but to
add something, however litde, everyone may hope; and of
every honestendeavour it is certain, that however, unsuccess
ful, it will be at last rewarded, (^mbler, 4: 325)
This exhortation could be directed equally at the landlord or
merchant, aristocrat or commoner, with the timorous on the side of
stagnation and the adventurous improver on the side of progress. It
follows that it is "a species of projectors...whose ends are generally
laudable; whose labours are innocent; who are searching out new
powers of nature, or contriving new works of art" that deserve the
highest praise. "From such men, and such only," Johnson writes, "are
we to hope for the cultivation of those parts of nature which lie waste;
and the invention of those arts which are yet wanting to the felicity of
life" (Idler, Adventurer,433-34). Unfortunately, the act of invention does
not earn, for the projector the veneration which is the glory of other
kinds of heroic action, whether military or political:
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Men, unaccustomed to reason and researches, think every
enterprise impracticable, which is extended beyond common
effects, or comprises many intermediate operations. Many
that presume to laugh at projectors, would consider a flight
through the air in a winged chariot, and the movement of a
mighty engine by the steam of water, as equally the dreams of
mechanic lunacy; and would hear, with equal negligence, of
the union of the Thames and the Severn by a canal, and the
scheme of Albuquerque the viceroy of the Indies, who in the
rage of hostility had contrived to make Egypt a barren desart,
by turning the Nile into the Red Sea. (Jdkr, Adventurer, 434,
435)

The very sweep of this argument suggests that we must distinguish
the triumphs of the successful innovator from the accumulations of the
merchant or manufacturer. Johnson's projector cannot count on an
assured calculable reward for his endeavors. He agrees to take chances
and spend his resources on projects that may well end in failure.
Johnson sees the noble, heroic side of this kind of activity; he makes
the inventor into a risk-taker who sacrifices caution in order to achieve
an always uncertain result." To some extent, this argument has
affinities with a tradition—agoing back to Marx—that assimilates the
restless search for innovation to the competitive spirit of capitalism.
Yet what is noteworthy about Johnson's vision of the innovator is that
it appears to disengage the motive force behind technological invention
from the drive to amass wealth. "The world is so adjusted," Johnson
writes, "that not only bread, but riches may he obtained without great
abilities or arduous performances; the most unskillful hand and
unenlightened mind have sufficient incitements to industry; for he that
is resolutely busy, can scarcely he in want" (Jdler, Adventurer, 385). The
process of "improvement" in the arts and sciences is thus attributed to
the talents of the inventor, not the moneymaker." Johnson is explicit.
"For further comments on invention and the inventor, see 'Rambler, Na 83 ^Rambler, 4; 71-75);
Idler, No. 57 (Idler, Adventurer, 177-80); On the superiority of common trade to philosophy as a
means of providing for the accommodation of life, see 'Ambler, No. 145 (^mbler, 5: 8—12);On
the importance of"curiosity" to invention,see Rambler, Na 180 (Rambler, 5:183-84). Rambler, Na
199, contains a letter from a projector (Rambbr, 5: 271-76).
"Adam Smith also attached considerable importance to invention and innovation, but Smith
regarded invention as the result of a narrowing of focus consequent on the division of labor: "A
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moreover, in dissociating both the projector and honest trader from the
majority of those who are engaged in the never ending search for
advantage: .
while a rightful claim to pleasure or to affluence must be
procured either by slow industry or uncertain hazard, there
will always be multitudes whom cowardice or impatience
incite to more safe and more speedy methods, who strive to
pluck the ficuit without cultivating the tree, and to share the
advantages ofvictory without partaking the dangers of battle.
(^mbler, 4: 334)
The separation of the projector from the pursuer of riches has the
further consequence that it removes the commercial virtues (sobriety,
calculation, foresight, etc.) from any necessary connection to the
activity of invention. The result is that the avoidance of risk and search
for security are attributed in Johnson not only to "slow industry" but
also to fraud or envy: "A little enquiry will discover that there are
nearer ways to profit than through the intricacies of art, or up the
steeps of labour. What wisdom and virtue scarcely receive at the end
of life, as the recompence of long toil and repeated efforts, is brought
within the reach of subtilty and dishonesty by more expeditious and
compendious measures...and the race of man may be divided in a
political estimate between those who are practising fraud, and those
who are repelling it" (^mbler, 4: 333)." Envy resembles fraud in this
respect, for unlike"interest,"Johnson writes in Rambler, No. 183, "envy

great part of the machinesmade use of in thosemanufactures in which labouris subdivided, were
originally the inventions of commonworkmen, who,being each of them employed in some very
simple operation, naturally turned their thou^ts towards finding out easier and readier methods
of performing it" Invention resulting from the division of labor is apparent also in trades
concerned with the production of new knowledge; "In the progress of society, philosophy or
speculation becomes, like every other employment, the piincipal or sole trade and occupation of
a particular class of dtiaens. Like every other employment too, it is subdivided into a great
number of different branches, each of which affords occupation to peculiar tribe or class of
philosophers; and this subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well as in every other
business, improves dexterity, and saves time. Each individual becomes more expert in his own
peculiar branch, more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of science is considerably
improved by it," Ax Inquiry into the Nature and Causes ofthe Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Canaan, 2
vols, in one (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 1,13,14.
"For Johnson's account of the consequences of fraud in commercial life, see Sermon 18 (On
Fraud), Sermons, 193-201.
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may act without expence, or danger. To spread suspicion, invent
calumnies, to propagate scandal requires neither labour nor courage. It
is easy for the author of a lye, however malignant, to escape detection,
and infamy needs very litde industry to assist its circulation" (^mbler,
5: 198). It is not merely honest toil but the desire to gain an unjust
advantage or to obstruct honest endeavor that become the central
phenomena, the ones through which the calculation of means and ends
becomes most visible. To this extent, Johnson implicitly describes,
although he certainly does not explicidy acknowledge, the ascription of
the maximizing activity in part to a shadowy realm of destructive
impulses that find an oudet in deceit or malice.
So there is clearly a strain in Johnson's moral thought that goes
against the story of the transformation of passions into interests
recounted by Hirschman. It is not the self-interest of the inventor or
trader that is universal and perpetual; in fact, Johnson insists, "envy is
almost the only vice which is practicable at aU times, and in every
place" {^mhkr, 5; 198). And it is here that Johnson comes closest to
rejecting the argument that moneymaking might be used as an oudet
that diverts men from troublesome human passions like envy. "I have
hitherto avoided that dangerous and empirical morality," Johnson
maintains, "which cures one vice by means of another." What he is
willing to grant is that "envy is so base and detestable, so vile in its
original, and so pernicious in its effects that the predominance of
almost any other quality is to be preferred"(^mbkr, 5; 200)i This could
not have been the case were wealth-getting seen as clearly superior to
other qualities.
It is the ardor of enterprise that occupies a position of superiority
in Johnson's moral thought. Traditionally the object of scorn, the
projector is now seen as the central figure in the drama of commercial
progress. To what extent was Johnson himself aware of the implica
tions of this argument and to what extent can it be related to his
critique of avarice?Johnson himself certainly did not make thelinkages
that I have been seeking to establish. Insofar as these linkages provide
a coherence to what would otherwise remain isolated strands in his
thought, they highlight a minor but significant aspect of his moral
essays. Yet it is surely worth noting that the prominence given to the
projector does not have to be inferred, for it is openly avowed in the
passages I have been quoting. For there is no denying Johnson's
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implicit claim that moral rigor in matters of judgment concerning riches
is perfecdy compatible with a high regard for the powers and preroga
tives of invention. And this double aspect extends, as we have seen,
across the range of Johnson's moral essays, from his condemnation of
accumulation to his praise of those activities that add to"the hereditory
aggregate of knowledge and happiness."
One might argue that these essays may not be Johnson's only or
even his final statement of the matter. In the list of newly canonical
works on commerce that Johnson recommends to the student of the
Preceptor
—works by Thomas Mun, Sir Josiah Child,John Locke,
Charles Davenant, and Joshua Gee—he seems to invoke precisely
those characteristics of industry, punctuality, and sobriety that were
celebrated by these writers and thus associated with the steadying hand
of interest in a commercial society.^ To this we might add his attrac
tion to the "mechanical arts" and his obvious affection for the
commercial side of life in London. But to single these out as the most
important lessons of Johnson's work is to ignore everything in his
writings that counts against the reduction of the passions to what can
be canalized into the comparatively harmless channels afforded by the
opportunity for moneymaking and private wealth. This includes values
that might be characterized as aristocratic—but with one difference. In
Johnson's essays, the crown of laurels is to be awarded to an aristocracy
of talent, not hereditary lineage or wealth—to the projector, not the
landlord, statesman, or general. And this is why his thinking cannot be
encompassed within any conventional paradigm of enlightened selfinterest. For Johnson, it is no argument against the the extensive
knowledge and great designs of the pioneering inventor that these
qualities cannot be equated with the industry and punctuality of the
trader. In fact,it is Johnson's recognition of this point—his unflinching
admiration for the energy and ingenuity of the hazardous risktaker—that prevented him from adopting the kind of rationalizing
outlook that Hirschman attributes to the triumph of capitalism.

""Johnson praises the "punctuality, or an exact and rigorous observance of commercial
engagements" in Rambler2Q\ {Ramhir, 5; 283). See also his allegory of labor and rest, Rambkrlti
{RambUr, 3:179-84).

